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What a pro rata cheque actually costs, and the band where it loses money

A pro rata cheque is ownership times round size, and companies that are worth more sell less. Defending cuts the multiple at every exit value there is.

Exercising pro rata is supposed to cost more than the original cheque, because the company is now worth more. On ordinary growth parameters it costs half the original cheque in the first follow-on round and three quarters in the second. The sentence everyone repeats is the wrong half of an identity.

A pro rata cheque is your ownership times the round size, and round size is dilution times post-money. Valuations rise, but companies that are worth more sell less of themselves, and the two effects largely cancel. Getting this backwards leads a fund to reserve for a cost it will not incur, and to skip the calculation that actually matters — the exit range in which defending your ownership destroys value.

The arithmetic, on ordinary parameters

A 600 fund with 15 core positions and an equal reserve alongside every initial dollar. That implies a 20 initial cheque, and at 15% entry ownership an implied entry post-money of 133.3. Two follow-on rounds: a 2.5× step-up selling 20%, then a 2.0× step-up selling 15%.

Post-moneyShare soldRound sizeYour pro rataAs a multiple of the initial cheque
Entry133.315%
Round C333.320%66.710.00.50×
Round D666.715%100.015.00.75×
Both rounds defended25.01.25×
A 600 fund, 15 positions, a 1:1 reserve, a 20 initial cheque for 15% of the company.

Defending through both rounds costs 1.25× the initial cheque, not more than the cheque in each. Notice what that does to the reserve: 20 was set aside for this name and the defence needs 25. A 1:1 reserve does not stretch to defending the winner, let alone to leaning in on it.

When would the usual sentence be true?

It is a one-line inversion. The pro rata exceeds the initial cheque when the cumulative step-up exceeds one over the dilution.

If the round sells......the pro rata exceeds the initial cheque only above a cumulative step-up of
10%10.0×
15%6.7×
20%5.0×
25%4.0×
30%3.3×
This deal’s cumulative step-up at round D is 5.0×.

At a twenty per cent round the company would have to be worth five times its entry valuation before the sentence became true. Growth rounds step up one and a half to three times, and later rounds sell less rather than more. The claim describes an outlier and is repeated as the norm.

What defending does to the position

Now the decision itself. Same company, same 1,500 exit, two policies: never follow on, or defend both rounds.

Never follows onDefends both rounds
Ownership at exit10.2%15.0%
Capital invested2045
Proceeds at a 1,500 exit153.0225.0
Profit133.0180.0
Multiple on invested capital7.65×5.00×
Internal rate of return40.4%40.8%
Same company, same exit, two reserve policies.

Defending adds 47 of profit and cuts the multiple from 7.65× to 5.00×, while the internal rate of return barely moves. That is not a quirk of these inputs. Follow-on dollars are bought at a higher price than the initial cheque by construction, so they must return a lower multiple, so the blended multiple must fall — at every exit value there is.

Which makes reserves a decision about what is being optimised. They buy profit dollars and the size of a distribution. They do not buy multiple. A fund whose first line to investors is a multiple is reporting the number its own reserve policy works against, and it is worth knowing that before the reserve memo rather than after the annual meeting.

The band where defending loses money outright

The follow-on dollars buy 4.8% of extra ownership for 25. Divide one by the other and there is an exit value below which they come back worth less than they cost.

Exit valueMultiple on the follow-on dollarsUndefended multipleDefended multipleReading
4000.77×2.04×1.33×the follow-on dollars lost money
5211.00×2.66×1.74×the follow-on dollars lost money
7501.44×3.83×2.50×
1,0001.92×5.10×3.33×
1,5002.88×7.65×5.00×
2,5004.80×12.75×8.33×
Below 521 the follow-on dollars come back worth less than they cost.

521. Below that exit the follow-on dollars lose money — and at that exit the original cheque is still returning 2.66× and the company is worth 3.9× what you paid for it. That is not a failure. It is the ordinary good-but-not-great outcome a growth fund produces most often, and defending ownership through it converts a solid winner into a worse one.

Does a 1:1 reserve even bind?

Two statements are both true and point in opposite directions. The reserve is too tight for the name that wins. It is also half unused across the book, because most positions never raise again.

PositionsPro rata eachTotal
Never raise again5
Raise once more71070
Raise twice more32575
Pure-defence need15145
Reserve pool300
Utilisation48.3%
Most positions never come back. The name that wins needs more than was set aside for it.

And the claim at the centre of every reserve memo

“Reserves shape a fund’s returns as much as picking winners does.” Test it like for like. Two funds, the same size, the same company set, no follow-on selection skill on either side. One reserves 1:1 and defends; the other reserves nothing and writes the same cheque into twice as many names.

NamesOwnership eachOwnership-units
No reserve — same cheque into twice as many names3010.2%3.06
1:1 reserve, defended1515.0%2.25
Gap36%
Same fund size, same company set, no follow-on selection skill on either side.

The no-reserve fund ends up owning 36% more of the identical company set, after dilution. The 1:1 fund can close that gap only by deploying its idle reserve — and at the same price per unit of ownership, closing it costs 1.02× what it has left. Break-even, almost exactly.

Which means the claim is not a parallel claim at all. It is the same claim wearing different clothes. A reserve buys nothing on its own: at the same price per unit of ownership it merely rebuys what concentration gave away. Everything it is worth is the quality of the follow-on decision — and the follow-on decision is picking winners, done later and at a higher price.

The measurement that makes a reserve policy honest

Compare the multiple your initial cheques returned with the multiple your follow-on dollars returned, across the whole book, adjusted for the shorter hold. If the second is not clearly higher, the reserve policy took value out of the fund. And since follow-ons are structurally bought at higher prices, that is the result to expect unless the record shows otherwise.

Three numbers are worth computing before the next reserve memo: the actual pro rata cost as a multiple of the initial cheque, the exit below which follow-on dollars lose money, and the share of the reserve pure defence will consume across the book. None of them takes more than a spreadsheet afternoon, and all three are usually assumed.

The workbook behind this article

Every figure above is a live formula in the companion file for The Growth Equity Investor, which also holds the round-by-round build, the exit-by-exit band, the reserve utilisation across the book and the like-for-like against a no-reserve fund. It is free, and it needs no account and no email address.

Open the companion file →

Also on this site

This note is drawn from The Growth Equity Investor. The book is on Amazon.

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