A Practitioner’s Guide to the Flat Book, the Hours It Averages Away, and the Margin Call That Arrives First
Julian R. Sterling
These are the four Excel workbooks that go with the book. Every figure the book prints is
reproduced in them by a live formula rather than a typed constant, and all four are built on the
same eight-row price duration curve — change an hour count, a price, the heat rate, the load
shape or the declared price move, and every dependent number moves. Each one ends with a
Checks sheet setting the printed figure beside the computed one:
50 controls in all, every one green, recalculated in LibreOffice.
Free to download. No sign-up, no email address, nothing to fill in.
Everything described below is inside it, with the read-me.
The four workbooks
Chapters 2 and 5
The price duration curve
The year’s 8,760 hours sorted and grouped into eight rows, and the two averages it
yields. The time-weighted average is 70.1872, and the annual baseload forward
is set equal to it by construction — which is why no figure in this book rests on a view
about the price level. The average over the plant’s 8,000 available hours is
73.6250, because the outage removes the cheapest hours of the year, and the
difference between those two numbers is the source of one of the book’s two headline
errors.
Also on the sheet: how many hours price below the average (a majority of them), the highest
hour as a multiple of the forward, and what deleting the top 100 hours does — it moves the
annual average by 2.1918 and removes 19.8548 per cent of a power station’s margin.
The_Price_Duration_Curve.xlsx · XLSX · 8 KB
Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7
The plant, four ways
The dispatch built row by row off the curve: marginal cost 65.32, 3,900
running hours of 8,000 available, 2,418,000 MWh, and a gross margin of
60,792,240 of which 42.7202 per cent is earned in 350 hours. Then the same
plant valued four ways — must-run and baseload-hedged, each priced at the annual forward
and at the average of the hours the block actually covers.
Two results fall out. A baseload hedge priced on its own hours, dispatched with buy-back, is
worth exactly what the unhedged plant is worth: hedging a plant as a block does not destroy its
optionality. And the wider gap a careless reader would quote, 36,650,855.53, is two things:
17,051,415.53 of an average taken over the wrong hour set, and
19,599,440 of genuine convexity. A second sheet moves the 760 outage hours to
the top of the curve, where they cost 36,057,216.
The_Plant_Four_Ways.xlsx · XLSX · 11 KB
Chapters 8, 9 and 10
Shape and the retail book
A book of 4,200,000 MWh sold at a fixed 78.50, hedged with a flat block bought at the forward,
booking a margin of 25,883,698.63. Then the load shape, as a multiplier on average load,
normalised so the year’s volume is exactly the contracted figure. The flat block costs
294,786,301.37; the hours cost 317,068,468.18.
The difference is the shape cost: 22,282,166.81, or 5.3053 per MWh, which is
86.0857 per cent of the margin the desk booked. The price the book is really
exposed to is not 70.1872 but the load-weighted 75.4925. The multipliers are
inputs: flatten them towards 1.00 and watch the cost fall away, which is the cheapest way to
see that the whole effect is a covariance between load and price.
Shape_and_the_Retail_Book.xlsx · XLSX · 9 KB
Chapters 11, 12, 13 and 14
Margin and liquidity
The position report says the book is 91.7031 per cent hedged and short 760,000 MWh, and both
figures are correctly computed. The sheet then reconciles them to the plant’s actual
output and finds a true short of 2,542,000 MWh, 3.3447x the
reported one, because the hedge was sized on 8,000 hours and the plant runs 3,900.
Then the cash. A declared parallel rise of 40.00 puts 198,400,000 of variation
margin out of the door the next morning against 158,000,000 of cash and undrawn facility. With
both legs cleared on one exchange the same position calls 30,400,000: a factor
of 6.5263x, decided by where the paperwork sits. The declared move is a cell, so the call, the
day-one position, the move that exhausts liquidity and the implied position limit all move with
it.
Margin_and_Liquidity.xlsx · XLSX · 9 KB
Conventions used throughout
Blue text
a hardcoded input — you may edit these
Yellow fill
an assumption that decides the answer
Black text
a formula — do not overtype these
Checks sheet
the printed figure beside the computed one, with a PASS or a FAIL
Why the checks matter more than the models
A workbook that agrees with a book proves nothing on its own — the author wrote both. What
the Checks sheets do is different: they force the model to reproduce a number that was printed
before the model existed, from a formula rather than from the number itself.
On this book the discipline caught the book’s own headline. An early draft valued the power
station as a flat block covering its 8,000 available hours and priced that block at the
annual forward of 70.1872, which is the average of all 8,760 — including the 760
cheapest hours, the ones the outage removes. The block should have been priced at
73.6250, the average of the hours it actually covers. On the wrong price the
plant’s apparent option value was 36,650,855.53; corrected, it is
19,599,440, and the missing 17,051,415.53 turns out to be a mispricing rather than
optionality. A book about averages taken over the wrong set of hours had taken an average over the
wrong set of hours, and the correction is in the text rather than quietly removed from it.
Where a shortcut and the full computation disagree, both are shown. The hour-set component is
4,960,000 multiplied by an unrounded 3.43778539, not by the printed 3.4378, and the two differ by
72.47; the flat retail block costs 294,786,301.37 on the unrounded average and 294,786,240.00 on
the printed one. Neither gap is smoothed away, because a reader who can see the gap is a reader
who will not be surprised by it.
Opening the files
The workbooks open in Microsoft Excel, LibreOffice Calc, Google Sheets and Numbers. They use
no macros and no add-ins, so nothing needs to be enabled or trusted. If your spreadsheet asks
to update links on opening, decline — there are none.
Also by Julian R. Sterling
The other books with companion files. The full list of titles is on the
author page.
Credit AnalysisOne borrower, four defensible EBITDAs, and the add-back argument worth fifty times the covenant headroom.
Closing the DealTwo defensible bridges 20.70 million apart, a peg worth 7.00 million, and the six choices that remove 6.60 of a 12.00 earn-out.
CMBS and CRE CLOsWhere the loss actually lands, from appraisal reduction to realised severity, and what the B-piece is really being paid for.
How to Read a Commercial LeaseThe three refinements chapter 19 names and never performs, and the renewal rate below which the mark-to-market is worth nothing.
How to Read a Credit AgreementWhere the default actually comes from, the cure that costs 5.5 times the other, and the capacity nobody adds up.
How to Read a Real Estate Loan AgreementThe cure ratio in closed form, the four-point window in which the cheap cure works, and the cure sized to the wrong threshold.
Office Real EstateA six per cent yield that returns 3.2 per cent once the re-letting cycle is paid for, and the headline-to-net-effective rent arithmetic.
Private Equity Real EstateBoth worked waterfalls to the dollar, the two capital stacks, and the arithmetic of the promote made changeable.
Private Markets PerformanceThirty-one of the thirty-three figures chapter 19 publishes reproduce exactly — and the two that do not are named rather than quietly adopted.
Raising a Real Estate FundThe chapter 17 funnel run on a calendar — when the first close actually lands, and why more travel does not help.
Real Estate FinanceFour people look at one building and reach four numbers; the lender is whole only above 105,109,489, twelve per cent below today’s value rather than forty.
Real Estate Financial ModelingProperty, development and fund models built line by line, and the modelling test worked end to end.
Real Estate Fund ManagementThe waterfall of 6.11, the build-to-core of 8.7 and the proceeds gap, reproduced as live formulas rather than asserted.
REIT Analysis and ValuationFFO of 532.0, AFFO of 381.0, net asset value and dividend safety — every figure a formula you can change.
Retail Real EstateThe occupancy cost of every unit in a centre, the sixteen per cent of the rent roll no tenant can sustain, and the right-size-convert-or-hold decision priced.
Sale and LeasebackA €179.5 million transaction end to end, with rent cover measured on the entity that actually signs the lease.
Self-Storage Real EstateThe cohort engine behind a 590-unit store, and the rate increase on existing customers priced against the move-outs it causes.
The Fund Finance ProfessionalChapter 8 builds the reported-to-eligible NAV bridge; chapter 9 computes every ratio without it. Two points at every state — and what a subscription line does to the IRR.
The Growth Equity InvestorWhat a pro rata cheque really costs, and the band where defending your ownership loses money.
The Private Credit InvestorThe two coverage ratios are not measured on the same thing: the erosion is 47.7 per cent, not the 28.7 the headline implies.
The Private Equity Fund Controller PlaybookThe book defines IRR, DPI, RVPI and TVPI, tells you to update them at the exit, and prints not one value. Computed: a 1.833× deal inside a fund at 0.892 TVPI.
The Venture Capital AssociateWhat defending a position costs, and how many companies a reserve pool actually defends.
Treasury ManagementFive people quote the cash balance of one company on one morning, from 214,000,000 to 68,400,000, and all five are right.
Financial Planning and AnalysisRevenue three per cent above budget, operating profit sixteen per cent below it, and not one figure misstated.
Financial Risk ManagementA fund inside every limit that cannot meet a redemption — and the number that decides it is the one with no currency attached.
Business ValuationThree advisers land 26.8 per cent apart on one company, and the whole gap turns out to be 1.96 points of perpetual growth.
Quantitative FinanceThree models agree to a quarter of one per cent about a number that one unobservable input moves a hundred and three times as much.
Asset ManagementFour people quote four returns for one mandate, all correct and 2.7017 points apart — forty-eight times the manager’s net skill.
Alternative InvestmentsA manager reports 13.29 per cent and the endowment earns 6.26 — both correct, and only a third of the advertised advantage arrives.
Venture CapitalOne company out of twenty-eight returns 56.7 per cent of the fund, and half the capital goes in after the decision — at half the return.
Machine Learning for FinanceFive people quote the accuracy of one credit model, all five are right, and the number that decides how much money it makes is none of them.
Commercial Real Estate InvestingThe equity earned 8.6647 per cent and the investor received exactly 8.0000 — the preferred return, and nothing above it.
Mergers and AcquisitionsThe board paper says the deal creates 13,436,667 of value. The arithmetic says it destroys 17,530,855. Nobody is lying.
DerivativesThe treasury report says the hedge cost 1,233,698. That is the interest differential, not a cost.
Construction Cost ControlA contract sum of 26,301,102 became a final account of 29,153,363 on the building that was drawn — and 85.8 per cent of what was lost was knowable on the day it was signed.
Pricing StrategyA list price of 148.00, a pocket price of 112.51, and the nine deductions in between — with what one point of price is actually worth.