Companion file
A Practitioner’s Guide to Strategy, Track Record, Terms and Getting to First Close
One Excel workbook. Chapter 17 prints the most useful table in the book — 180 names screened down to eight commitments and a first close of 100,000,000 — and it has no dates in it. Everything else in the chapter is about time. This file runs the same funnel, at the same conversion rates, on a calendar. It is free. Nothing is gated behind a sign-up, and no email address is asked for.
Appendix F · Chapters 15, 17, 18 and 20
The printed funnel does not obey the rule printed beside it. Half grant a first meeting, half produce a second, half enter diligence, half reach a soft circle, two-thirds convert. Applied to 180 names those five rules give 90, 45, 22.5, 11.25 and 7.5 — not 90, 40, 22, 12 and 8. Two of the five stages round the wrong way and the errors very nearly cancel, which is why nobody notices. But 7.5 commitments is 93,750,000 against a stated first close of 100,000,000. To close eight on the rules as worded, the screened list has to be 192 names, not 180.
The eight investors do not arrive as eight investors. Run the same funnel on a calendar and they arrive as two lumps, because soft circles wait for quarterly committees: 37,500,000 closing in month 7.6 and 56,250,000 in month 11.3. The hundred million is never reached at all. Chapter 17 computes, to the unit, that a slip from month nine to month fifteen costs 1,950,000 — and the workbook reproduces that figure exactly. It is not the cost of a delay. It is the cost of the plan.
The response to the start date is a cliff, not a slope. Beginning in week 19 through week 25 all close the same 93,750,000 by month twelve. Week 27 closes 81,250,000. Week 28 closes 75,000,000, and the first close jumps from month 6.5 to month 9.9, because the leading cohort misses a papers deadline by days and takes everything behind it along. A third of the money moves on a decision about which week in June to begin.
The house does not survive its own first close. The chapter’s management company costs 200,000 a month; its 100,000,000 first close at 1.5 per cent pays 125,000 — 62.5 per cent of the burn. The capital that has to close before the fee covers the cost is 160,000,000. The partners fund 2,095,312 by month twelve and 4,082,812 by month thirty-six, and the house never turns cash-positive on the first close alone.
Two rules the book never puts in the same sentence. Chapter 20 sets the first close at a quarter to a third of target; Appendix C computes break-even at full fund size. The fee at first close is charged on what has closed. A quarter-close covers the Appendix C budget only from a target of 485,714,286; a third-close only from 364,285,714. The book’s own 300,000,000 fund runs a 375,000 annual deficit, and that deficit is the committed partner capital chapter 20’s third test asks for — the number chapter 18 says a reviewer will call a thin runway.
And the fix is not the one a founder reaches for. Two constraints bind: the list and the diary. Going from six sessions a week to twelve at 180 names changes nothing. Going from 180 names to 240 at the same six a week closes 112,500,000. Sixty more names is worth more than doubling the travel. Thirty-three checks.
Go to sheet 8 and read the second column downwards. Then change the start week on sheet 1 to 28 and watch sheet 4 rebuild: the leading cohort misses a papers deadline by days, waits a full quarter, and takes the whole raise with it. That single step is the chapter’s own sentence about the first of March, applied to the chapter’s own funnel. Then find the book’s cell on sheet 9 — 180 names, six a week. Move right along the row and nothing happens. Move down the column and the target is cleared.
It cannot tell you your own conversion rates, and those are the first inputs to replace. It cannot tell you whether a particular investor’s committee is monthly or quarterly — which is exactly why chapter 17 tells you to ask, in those words, when it sits and who writes the paper. And it cannot judge a strategy: a funnel that converts badly because the fund is wrong for the market looks identical, in this workbook, to one that converts badly because the list is too short. The chapter’s own test settles that one, and it is not arithmetic — if eleven investors decline for the same reason, that reason is the product.
| Amber fill | an input — you may edit these |
| Grey fill | a formula — do not overtype these |
| ASSUMPTION | an input the book does not state, each labelled with the reason |
| Checks sheet | thirty-three controls — five exist only to reproduce the book before disagreeing with it |
Every figure is illustrative. The fund, the house and the investors are invented, as they are in the book. Every input is one the book states, except two session counts and three stage durations, which are labelled as deductions beside the sentence in the book they are deduced from.
The workbook opens in Microsoft Excel, LibreOffice Calc, Google Sheets and Numbers. It uses no macros and no add-ins, so nothing needs to be enabled or trusted. If your spreadsheet asks to update links on opening, decline — there are none.
The other books with companion files. The full list of titles is on the author page.
These files accompany Raising a Real Estate Fund. The book is on Amazon.
If this book helped — or didn’t — a few lines on Amazon are worth more than they look: they are what the next reader goes on. Write a review. The workbook stays free either way.